<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Nouri Alnahawi | UCS</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/author/nouri-alnahawi/</link><atom:link href="https://ucs.h-da.de/author/nouri-alnahawi/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><description>Nouri Alnahawi</description><generator>Hugo Blox Builder (https://hugoblox.com)</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2025 05:01:40 +0000</lastBuildDate><item><title>A Lot of Data and Added Complexity. How Does PQC Affect the Performance of My TLS Connection?</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2025-isc-henrich/</link><pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2025 05:01:40 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2025-isc-henrich/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>In a previous study, Henrich et al. (ISC &amp;lsquo;23) demonstrate how TLS handshake performance is affected not only by different Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Key Encapsulation Mechanisms KEMs and security levels, but also by varying physical network conditions. In particular, they show that prior to selecting a PQC scheme replacement for TLS, it is important to conduct an analysis of the anticipated network conditions for applications that require a high level of responsiveness. In this paper, we build upon the afore mentioned work and complement the previous experiments to include digital signature PQC schemes and hybrid variants, as well as various compositions of certificate chains. Moreover, an analysis is conducted on the effects of deploying real physical servers and varying the underlying network stack configuration. Our results show that incorporating PQC signature schemes does not negatively impact the overall transmission time as substantially as poor network conditions. However, operating at high security levels frequently results in delays using PQC schemes. These findings are consistent across hybrid schemes as well. We conclude that migrating TLS to PQ-only or hybrid usage can generally be undertaken with a high degree of confidence. However, considering suboptimal network conditions or the use of higher security levels, a cautious transition is recommended. In such cases, the configuration of certificate chains or increasing the TCP Congestion Window might prove beneficial.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>PMMP-PQC Migration Management Process</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2024-eicc-vonnethen-pmmp/</link><pubDate>Sun, 16 Jun 2024 05:02:36 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2024-eicc-vonnethen-pmmp/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Organizations have to plan on migrating to quantum-resilient cryptographic measures, also known as PQC. However, this is a difficult task, and to the best of our knowledge, there is no generalized approach to manage such a complex migration for cryptography used in IT systems that explicitly integrates into organizations’ steering mechanisms and control systems. We present PMMP, a risk-based process for managing the migration of organizations from classic cryptography to PQC and establishing crypto-agility. Having completed the initial design phase, as well as a theoretical evaluation, we now intend to promote PMMP. Practitioners are encouraged to join the effort in order to enable a comprehensive practical evaluation and further development.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>On Criteria and Tooling for Cryptographic Inventories</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2024-gi-sicherheit-schmitt-cdt/</link><pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 05:01:40 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2024-gi-sicherheit-schmitt-cdt/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>When cryptography becomes insecure, a migration to new schemes is required. Often the migration process is very complicated, but the time available is very limited. Only if the used cryptographic algorithms, protocols and configurations are known can a system be efficiently and fully adapted to changed security situations. This creates the need for a crypto-inventory that gathers this knowledge. Consequently, the question arises what criteria a crypto-inventory must fulfill to support this adaptation. It also highlights the need for tools to assist compilation. We therefore conducted a literature survey and extracted key requirements. Missing content was supplemented by expanding existing requirements or adding new ones. Furthermore, appropriate metrics were assigned to assess the fulfillment of the requirements for a certain crypto-inventory implementation. Regarding the tooling, we identified five major areas of interest — installed software, connected hardware, communication, stored data and source code scanning — and provide prototypes for semi-automatic creation of crypto-inventories for three of them. This provides organizations with a starting point to understand their cryptographic landscape as a prerequisite for crypto-agility and crypto-migration. However, theoretical design and prototypes have not yet been evaluated. This will be done as a follow-up to this work. All types of organizations are invited to participate.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Toward Next Generation Quantum-Safe eIDs and eMRTDs: A Survey</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2024-embedcs-alnahawi-eid-survey/</link><pubDate>Sat, 16 Mar 2024 05:00:48 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2024-embedcs-alnahawi-eid-survey/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Security mechanisms of Electronic Personal Documents (eCards) depend on (asymmetric) cryptography that is and always has been subject to the threat of compromise, be it from conventional attacks or quantum computers. With Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), we now have alternative building blocks at hand that can be leveraged to protect against both kind of attacks. Thus, PQC should be incorporated into eCard ecosystems, yet it is not clear how this is done best. In the work at hand, we review the state of currently used crypto-systems for eCard security, as well as their possible quantum-secure replacements. Further, we identify and categorize respective challenges that need to be addressed, present and assess existing approaches for their solution, and formulate research questions for open issues. By providing an overview of the situation, we help unraveling the issue and pave the way toward quantum-safe electronic Identity Documents and electronic Machine-Readable Travel Documents.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>On the State of Crypto Agility</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2022-bsi-alnahawi-crypto-agility/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2022-bsi-alnahawi-crypto-agility/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Cryptographic primitives and protocols require constant modifications and adaptations in order to maintain the security of IT-systems. Many researchers argue that applying the notion of crypto-agility provides more feasible and practical updating of cryptographic systems, especially in the light of the expected transition to PQC. However, there is no unified definition for this notion, nor a common understanding of the requirements that can enable it. Moreover, it is not entirely clear what measures need to be taken in order to apply crypto-agility in practice, and which aspects and challenges exist towards this endeavor. We compare the various definitions of crypto-agility including its requirements and varying facets, and investigate the state of readiness of crypto-agility by surveying works dealing with general challenges and recommendations in this regard. We present the survey and discuss discovered challenges and solutions and utilize our findings to evaluate the state of readiness for crypto-agility.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>On the State of Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2021-informatik-alnahawi-migration/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2021-informatik-alnahawi-migration/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Safeguarding current and future IT security from quantum computers implies more than the mere development of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Much work in this respect is currently being conducted, making it hard to keep track of the many individual challenges and respective solutions so far identified. In consequence, it is difficult to judge, whether all (known) challenges have been sufficiently addressed, and whether suitable solutions have been provided. We present results of a literature survey and discuss discovered challenges and solutions categorized into different areas and utilize our findings to evaluate the state of readiness for a full scale PQC migration. We use our findings as starting point to initiate an open community project in the form of a website to keep track of the ongoing efforts and the state of the art in PQC research. Thereby, we offer a single entry-point for the community into the subject reflecting the current state in a timely manner.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>