<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Alexander Wiesmaier | UCS</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/author/alexander-wiesmaier/</link><atom:link href="https://ucs.h-da.de/author/alexander-wiesmaier/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><description>Alexander Wiesmaier</description><generator>Hugo Blox Builder (https://hugoblox.com)</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 16 Jun 2024 05:02:36 +0000</lastBuildDate><item><title>PMMP-PQC Migration Management Process</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2024-eicc-vonnethen-pmmp/</link><pubDate>Sun, 16 Jun 2024 05:02:36 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2024-eicc-vonnethen-pmmp/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Organizations have to plan on migrating to quantum-resilient cryptographic measures, also known as PQC. However, this is a difficult task, and to the best of our knowledge, there is no generalized approach to manage such a complex migration for cryptography used in IT systems that explicitly integrates into organizations’ steering mechanisms and control systems. We present PMMP, a risk-based process for managing the migration of organizations from classic cryptography to PQC and establishing crypto-agility. Having completed the initial design phase, as well as a theoretical evaluation, we now intend to promote PMMP. Practitioners are encouraged to join the effort in order to enable a comprehensive practical evaluation and further development.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>On Criteria and Tooling for Cryptographic Inventories</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2024-gi-sicherheit-schmitt-cdt/</link><pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 05:01:40 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2024-gi-sicherheit-schmitt-cdt/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>When cryptography becomes insecure, a migration to new schemes is required. Often the migration process is very complicated, but the time available is very limited. Only if the used cryptographic algorithms, protocols and configurations are known can a system be efficiently and fully adapted to changed security situations. This creates the need for a crypto-inventory that gathers this knowledge. Consequently, the question arises what criteria a crypto-inventory must fulfill to support this adaptation. It also highlights the need for tools to assist compilation. We therefore conducted a literature survey and extracted key requirements. Missing content was supplemented by expanding existing requirements or adding new ones. Furthermore, appropriate metrics were assigned to assess the fulfillment of the requirements for a certain crypto-inventory implementation. Regarding the tooling, we identified five major areas of interest — installed software, connected hardware, communication, stored data and source code scanning — and provide prototypes for semi-automatic creation of crypto-inventories for three of them. This provides organizations with a starting point to understand their cryptographic landscape as a prerequisite for crypto-agility and crypto-migration. However, theoretical design and prototypes have not yet been evaluated. This will be done as a follow-up to this work. All types of organizations are invited to participate.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Toward Next Generation Quantum-Safe eIDs and eMRTDs: A Survey</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2024-embedcs-alnahawi-eid-survey/</link><pubDate>Sat, 16 Mar 2024 05:00:48 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2024-embedcs-alnahawi-eid-survey/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Security mechanisms of Electronic Personal Documents (eCards) depend on (asymmetric) cryptography that is and always has been subject to the threat of compromise, be it from conventional attacks or quantum computers. With Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), we now have alternative building blocks at hand that can be leveraged to protect against both kind of attacks. Thus, PQC should be incorporated into eCard ecosystems, yet it is not clear how this is done best. In the work at hand, we review the state of currently used crypto-systems for eCard security, as well as their possible quantum-secure replacements. Further, we identify and categorize respective challenges that need to be addressed, present and assess existing approaches for their solution, and formulate research questions for open issues. By providing an overview of the situation, we help unraveling the issue and pave the way toward quantum-safe electronic Identity Documents and electronic Machine-Readable Travel Documents.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Performance Impact of PQC KEMs on TLS 1.3 Under Varying Network Characteristics</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2023-infosec-henrich-pqc-kem/</link><pubDate>Fri, 16 Jun 2023 05:00:35 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2023-infosec-henrich-pqc-kem/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Widely used asymmetric primitives such as RSA or Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH), which enable authentication and key exchange, could be broken by Quantum Computers (QCs) in the coming years. Quantum-safe alternatives are urgently needed. However, a thorough investigation of these schemes is crucial to achieve sufficient levels of security, performance, and integrability in different application contexts. The integration into Transport Layer Security (TLS) plays an important role, as this security protocol is used in about 90% of today’s Internet connections and relies heavily on asymmetric cryptography. In this work, we evaluate different Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) key establishment schemes in TLS 1.3 by extending the framework of Paquin et al.. We analyze the TLS handshake performance under variation of network parameters such as packet loss. This allows us to investigate the suitability of PQC KEMs in specific application contexts. We observe that Kyber and other structured lattice-based algorithms achieve very good overall performance and partially beat classical schemes. Other approaches such as FrodoKEM, HQC and BIKE show individual disadvantages. For these algorithms, there is a clear performance decrease when increasing the security level or using a hybrid implementation, e.g., a combination with ECDH. This is especially true for FrodoKEM, which, however, meets high security requirements in general. It becomes clear that performance is strongly influenced by the underlying network processes, which must be taken into account when selecting PQC algorithms.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Towards a maturity model for crypto-agility assessment</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2023-fps-2022-hohm-camm/</link><pubDate>Sat, 01 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2023-fps-2022-hohm-camm/</guid><description>&lt;!-- Supplementary notes can be added here, including [code and math](https://sourcethemes.com/academic/docs/writing-markdown-latex/). --></description></item><item><title>cryptolib: comparing and selecting cryptography libraries</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2022-eicc-wohlwender-cryptolib/</link><pubDate>Fri, 06 May 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2022-eicc-wohlwender-cryptolib/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Selecting a library out of numerous candidates can be a laborious and resource-intensive task. We present the cryptolib index, a tool for decision-makers to choose the best fitting cryptography library for a given context. To define our index, 15 library attributes were synthesized from findings based on a literature review and interviews with decision-makers. These attributes were afterwards validated and weighted via an online survey. In order to create the index value for a given library, the individual attributes are assessed using given evaluation criteria associated with the respective attribute. As a proof of concept and to give a practical usage example, the derivation of the cryptolib values for the libraries BouncyCastle and Tink are shown in detail. Overall, by tailoring the weighting of the cryptolib attributes to their current use case, decision-makers are enabled to systematically select a cryptography library fitting best to their software project at hand in a guided, repeatable and reliable way.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Towards a maturity model for crypto-agility assessment</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2022-preprint-hohm-camm/</link><pubDate>Mon, 14 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2022-preprint-hohm-camm/</guid><description>&lt;!-- Supplementary notes can be added here, including [code and math](https://sourcethemes.com/academic/docs/writing-markdown-latex/). --></description></item><item><title>On the State of Crypto Agility</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2022-bsi-alnahawi-crypto-agility/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2022-bsi-alnahawi-crypto-agility/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Cryptographic primitives and protocols require constant modifications and adaptations in order to maintain the security of IT-systems. Many researchers argue that applying the notion of crypto-agility provides more feasible and practical updating of cryptographic systems, especially in the light of the expected transition to PQC. However, there is no unified definition for this notion, nor a common understanding of the requirements that can enable it. Moreover, it is not entirely clear what measures need to be taken in order to apply crypto-agility in practice, and which aspects and challenges exist towards this endeavor. We compare the various definitions of crypto-agility including its requirements and varying facets, and investigate the state of readiness of crypto-agility by surveying works dealing with general challenges and recommendations in this regard. We present the survey and discuss discovered challenges and solutions and utilize our findings to evaluate the state of readiness for crypto-agility.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>On the State of Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2021-informatik-alnahawi-migration/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2021-informatik-alnahawi-migration/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Safeguarding current and future IT security from quantum computers implies more than the mere development of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Much work in this respect is currently being conducted, making it hard to keep track of the many individual challenges and respective solutions so far identified. In consequence, it is difficult to judge, whether all (known) challenges have been sufficiently addressed, and whether suitable solutions have been provided. We present results of a literature survey and discuss discovered challenges and solutions categorized into different areas and utilize our findings to evaluate the state of readiness for a full scale PQC migration. We use our findings as starting point to initiate an open community project in the form of a website to keep track of the ongoing efforts and the state of the art in PQC research. Thereby, we offer a single entry-point for the community into the subject reflecting the current state in a timely manner.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Zur Integration von Post-Quantum Verfahren in bestehende Softwarepodukte</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2021-bsi-zeier-pqc-integration/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2021-bsi-zeier-pqc-integration/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="zusammenfassung">Zusammenfassung&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Aktuell werden PQC-Algorithmen standardisiert, um der aufziehenden Gefahr für
konventionelle asymmetrische Algorithmen durch Quantencomputer zu begegnen. Diese neuen
Algorithmen müssen dann in bestehende Protokolle, Applikationen und Infrastrukturen
eingebunden werden. Dabei ist mit Integrationsproblemen zu rechnen, die einerseits durch
Inkompatibilitäten mit existierenden Standards und Implementierungen begründet sind,
andererseits aber auch durch fehlendes Wissen der Softwareentwickler über die Handhabung
von PQC-Algorithmen zustande kommen. Um Inkompatibilitäten beispielhaft aufzuzeigen,
integrieren wir zwei unterschiedliche PQC-Algorithmen in zwei verschiedene bestehende
Softwareprodukte (InboxPager E-Mail Client und TLS Implementierung der Bouncy
Castle Bibliothek). Hierbei setzen wir auf die hoch-abstrahierende Krypto-Bibliothek
eUCRITE, die Entwicklern das Detailwissen über die korrekte Verwendung klassischer und
PQC-Algorithmen abnimmt und damit bereits einige potentielle Implementierungsfehler
vermeidet. Die dabei zutage getretenen Probleme bestätigen teilweise bereits bekannte
Inkompatibilitäten, beinhalten aber auch neue, bisher nicht angesprochene Schwierigkeiten.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Zur Benutzbarkeit und Verwendung von API-Dokumentationen</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2020-muc-huesmann-api/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2020-muc-huesmann-api/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="zusammenfassung">Zusammenfassung&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Eine gute Dokumentation ist essenziell für eine gute Benutzbarkeit von (Sicherheits-)APIs, d.h. insbesondere für die korrekte Verwendung der APIs. Anforderungen an eine gute Dokumentation von APIs wurden in mehreren Arbeiten beschrieben, jedoch gibt es bislang keine technische Umsetzung (im folgenden Dokumentationssystem genannt), welche diese Anforderungen umsetzt. Die Anforderungen lassen sich unterteilen in Anforderungen an das Dokumentationssystem und Anforderungen an den Dokumentationsinhalt. Aus 13 identifizierten Anforderungen an ein Dokumentationssystem selbst wurden im Rahmen dieser Arbeit 9 in einen Prototypen umgesetzt und in einer Nutzerstudie mit 22 Probanden unter Verwendung einer kryptografischen API evaluiert. Es hat sich gezeigt, dass die Umsetzung der Anforderung Schnelle Nutzung der API ermöglichen zum einen wesentlich von der Qualität der eingepflegten Inhalte abhängt, zum anderen aber auch 5 weitere der betrachteten Anforderungen bzw. deren Umsetzungen subsumiert. Die zwei weiteren umgesetzten Anforderungen (Klassische Referenz und Rückfragen und Kommentarfunktion) wurden von den Probanden kaum oder nicht eingesetzt. Deren Nützlichkeit und Relevanz sollte in einer Langzeitstudie untersucht werden.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>API Usability of Stateful Signature Schemes</title><link>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2019-iwsec-zeier-api/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ucs.h-da.de/publication/2019-iwsec-zeier-api/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>The rise of quantum computers poses a threat to asymmetric cryptographic schemes. With their continuing development, schemes such as DSA or ECDSA are likely to be broken in a few years’ time. We therefore must begin to consider the use of different algorithms that would be able to withstand powerful quantum computers. Among the considered algorithms are hash-based signature schemes, some of which, including XMSS, are stateful. In comparison to stateless algorithms, these stateful schemes pose additional implementation challenges for developers, regarding error-free usage and integration into IT systems. As the correct use of cryptographic algorithms is the foundation of a secure IT system, mastering these challenges is essential.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>